Rights of the Minority Stockholders by Kreidler, Charles Ray
Cornell Law Library
Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository
Historical Theses and Dissertations Collection Historical Cornell Law School
1893
Rights of the Minority Stockholders
Charles Ray Kreidler
Cornell Law School
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/historical_theses
Part of the Law Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Historical Cornell Law School at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Historical Theses and Dissertations Collection by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital
Repository. For more information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kreidler, Charles Ray, "Rights of the Minority Stockholders" (1893). Historical Theses and Dissertations Collection. Paper 333.
T H E S I S.
RIGHTS OF THE ;!.OTUITTY STOCKHOLDERS.
By
Charles Ray Kreidler.
CORNELL ITIVERSITY.
1893.
C 0 14 T E 11 T S .
Introduction. - - I.
I. General Rights and Remedies of the Minority--4.
II. Rights regarding-
(I) Inspection of the Books.-------------- 12,
(2) Voting -,--------------------------------13.
(3) Notice of Meetings ------------------- 14.
(4) Dividends. ---------------------------- 15.
(5) Issues of Watered Stock --------------- 17.
(6) Consolidation, Amendments to Chartor,
and Dissolution. ------------------------- 25.
III.Manner in which the Minority may bring
Actions. ------------------------------------ 33.
IV. Conclusion. - -------------------------------- 36.
AUTHORITIES CITED.
Abbott v Johnson &c. Horse R.R. Co. 80 N.Y. 27. -------- 29.
Atvrool v Merryveather, L.R. 5 Eq. 464. --------------- 34.
Barr v II.Y.L.E. & W. R.R. Co. 96 N.Y. 444, ----------- 10.
Bailey v Gas, Coal & Coke Co., 69 Pa. St. 334. -------- 16.
Blatchford v Ross, 54 Bar. 42. ------------------------ 27.
Brewer v Bos. Theater Co., 104 Mass. 378 ------------- 34,
Brinckerhoff v Bostrick, 88 N.Y. 52 ------------------ 7.
Buffalo 6 J.Y. City R.R. Co.y Dudley, 14 N.Y. 336, --- 31.
Christensen v Eno, IOG N.Y. 97. ----------------------- 24.
Coit v II.C. Gold Amal. Co., 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. (U.S.) 2b1-20.
Denkie v Lime Co,, 80 N.Y. 599 -I---------------------- 31.
Dodge v Woolsey, 18 How.(U.S.) 331. ------------------- 9.
Dunphy v Trav. Newspaper Ass,,146 Mass. 495. ..........- 6.
Elyton Land Co. v B.W. El, Co., 9 So. R. 129. --------- 20.
Foreman v Bigelow, 4 Cliff. 508. ---------------------- 19.
Gamble v Queens Co. Water Co., 25 N.E. 201. ------ 13,I8.
Handley v Stutz, 139 U.S. 417. ------------------------ 23.
Hun v Cary, 82 n.Y, 65. ------------------------------ 6.
Jones v Bank of Leadville, 17 Pac. 272, -------------- 32.
Karnes v Rochester & Genesee R.R. Co. 4 Abb.(N.S.) 107-16.
Kean v Johnson, 9 N.J.Eq. 401. -------------------- 26, 319
Knowlton v Spring Co., 57 I1.y, 5180 - 18.
Laws 1882 Chap. 409 sec. 199. -............-- 120
Owltown & Lincoln R.R* Co.y Veasic, 39 Me, 571 -0-------0.
People v Eadie, 30 N.E. 1147. - ------------------------ 13,
Pomeroy Eq. Jur. Vol, III. pp. 9,10. ---- --
R.R. Co. v Hughes, 22 Mo. 291 ------------------------ 3
Revision p. 186 sec. 50, -----------------------------
Robinson v Smith, 3 Paige 222. ------------------- 8, Ib
Smith v Prattville &c. Co., 29 Ala. 503, ---------- 16
State v Ohio & M.R.R. Co., 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 415. --- 13,
Stimson American Statue Law, Vol, II sections 8380,-81-28,
Town of Middletown v Bos, & N.YqAir Line Co. 52 Conn.351-29.
Trans, Co, v Beatty, L.R. 12 App. Cas. 598, ---------- 13.
Wiggins v Freewill Baptist Church, 49 Mass. 301. --14, Ib.
Zabriskie v R.R, Co., 18 N.J.Eq. 178. - ---------------- 30.
RIGHTS OF THE IMINORITY SToCKHOLDERS.
INTRODUCTION.
The growth of corporations has been marvelous during the
past few decades, yet it is indisputable that the require-
ments of trade and the variously increasing nunber of new
enterprises have demanded such growth in this mode of con-
ducting many of the business affairs of the present cen-
tury. The creation of this "legal entity" with its peculiar
safeguards has been the means by which great capitalists
first dared to venture the investment of their funds in
many enterprises. The limited liability to which the stock-
holders of a corporation is subject has made timid men bold
enough to enter enterprises which if the partner-ship alone
existed would never have been dreamed of. To this element
of the corporation is due the existence, at the present
day, of our extensive system of railroads, banking insti-
tutions, and other great enterprises. The partnership
liability was too great, and the success of these enter-
prises too uncertain for them to grow or receive favor with-
out the safety of the institution known as the "creature
of the law".
!While the invention of the corporation has proved of
great benefit in aiding and giving an incentive to business
enterprises of all descriptionsyet the manner in which it
is necessarily conducted affords many opportunities for
the commission of frauds. In the early days of corporations
it became firmly established that the majority has exclu-
sive control over the affairs of the corporation. This
was deemed a necessary consequence of the corporation's
existence.
For some time after the creation of the first corpo-a-
tions the injured minority stockholders had few if any reh.-
edies against the managing body, however flagrant their acts
might be. Later, however, the court of equity c-me to the
rescue of the body of stok)holders who because of the in-
feriority of their nLmuber, were overpowered by the acts of
those constituting the majority, and recogonized their
rights to a limited extent. Even then, however, the con',
ditions must be of a peculiar and alarming nature in order
that judicial cognizance would be taken of an alleged injury
to the minority.
While to the present day the management of the affairs
of the corporation is largely within the discretionary pow-
er of the majority, yet there has been a gradual and contin-
ual enlarnent of the powers of the courts to remedy, wrongs
which are comriitted by the governing body, or result from
the omission on its part to perform soriae duty.
In the following pages the object will be to consider
some of the more important circumstances in which the courts
have come to take cognizance of injuries to the minority
stockholders.
No attempt will be made to more than incidently refer
to wrongs of which the courts have taken jurisdiction from
ancient times, and which arise out of the ordinary business
associations more naturally than out of corporate relations.
i 0ENERAL RIGHTS AND RE.I iDIES OF THE MINORITY.
The broad proposition is often laid down by the couirts
that a court of equity has power to remedy every wrong
which may arise, whether or not there has been a rule form-
ulated to apply to the particular case in hand, Plainly
" v rlook
those maintaining this doctri.eAmany lonJ established cus-
toms of equity. Thus a very general exception to this prop-
osition is found in the attitude which courits of equity
assume towards the acts of the majority stockholders of a
corporation. For example, it is well established that
when property is turned over to the corporation by sub-
scribersin ?ayment of their stock, other subscribers cannot
complain so long as the directors hve not been guilty of
bad faith in placing a valuation upon the property so re-
ceived, even though they may actually have exercised very
bad judgment. It matters not if the property be worth less
than one half the estimated value and the financial con-
dition of the corporation by reason of such transactinns
is well-nigh ruined. Further, it is conceded on all hands
that as regards the inner transactions of the corporation,
in the absence of actual fraud, the directors and majority
stockholders have absolute control over the management of
the corporation, even though the minority stockholders are
in such pecaliar circumnstances that the acts of the con-
trolling body work great d nmagettorntheir interests.
doctr in ,
It is said in juastification of this well established ,
and in many cases perhaps justly, that those entering the
corporation do so upon an implied condition that they will
s-ub t. o the rule of the majority.
Further exceptions will appear upon the consideration
of the various matters relating to the subject now being
:invest iga ted..
The courts often hold that the controlling body of
a corporation must perform each and eve-y duty which is im-
posed upon them with the utmost good faitii to all inter-
ested in the affairs of the corpoi:ation.
occurin6
If this princi,)le were strictly enforceable, the often,
"freeze out" and the many combinations and "trusts", would
be prevented. Thc dif ficulty lies in the fact that those
carrying on the affairs of the corporation do so in such a
manner that their aims are accomplished bp skiilfully
covering up all t-aces of proof of the transaction and the
injured minority stockholders are absolutely unable to
satisfactorily explain to the court how they were defrauded.
This condition of affairs presents a great stumblin. block
to the courts, and often is the explanation of the failure
of the ..,inority to sustain actions ag.inst th,. majority.
By most of the aithorities the directors of he coopo-
ration are regarded as occupying the relation of trustees
to the corporation.and the courts often lay down the 6en-
real proposition that sach officers must use the care of an
ordinary prudent business man, or the care which a person
exercises in conducting his own business a!fairs(a). Jist
what amouants to the requisite care or discretion is often
a difficult matter, and must be solved by a careful con-
sidoration of all the circumstances.
It often occurs that the officers of the corporation
own a majority of the stock, and are thus the better able
to direct the affairs of the corporation with a view to
promote their own interests and injure those of the minor-
ity. Plainly this is in violation of their trust relation
and the injured stockholders by resorting to a court of eq-
uity may obtain relief.
In the case of Dunphy v Travellers Newspaper Ass. (146
Mass. 49'5.) the president of the defendant corporation was
the owner or controller of a majority of the stock, and
by reason of his power , controlled the election of the
(a) Hun v Cary; 82 N.Y. 65.
directo-s, whom he was able to manage in his own interest.
Large sums of the corporation had been invested in outside
concerns, and another large portion of the corporate fanas
was kept on hand without drawing interes$, and in addition
he had improperly received large anlioants as his salary.
The courts held that relief should be .ranted the injured
stockholders, and in the course of the opinion declared
that "Courts of equity are swift to protect helpless minor-
ities of stockholders from the oppression And iraad of
majorities. "
The directors are equally responsible for omission or
neglect to pe-form corporate dities, and for acts which
they do that work an injury upon the stockholders. Thus
where the directors of a bank permit the property, aioney
and effects of the bank to be stolen, wasted and squandered
by allowing insolvent pe sons to overdraw their accounts
etc., the directors will be held strictly responsible for
the breach of duty(a).
It is generally admitted by the courts that all acts
of the officers of the corporation which are performed
with bad faith, cannot be ratified by the majority stock-
holders. On the other hand, it is equally authoritive
-----------------------------
(a) Brinkerhoff v i3os-twick; 88 N.Y. 52.
that even if the minority have saffered r'iatly from the
manner in wiacn the affairs of the curportion have been
conricted, yet if there has been no actual fraud and the
acts thus injuring the ninority are assented to by the
majo-ity of the stockholders, there is no relief allowed
the injured members of the corporation. In regard to ultra
vires act.,however, there is an exception to this -Loctrine,
and it is held that as to acts which are beyond the powers
and privileges granted by the legislature to the corpor.:tion
there is no powet of ratification(a). Under such circum-
stances a single dissenting stockholder can enjoin the
performance of the unauathorized acts. To effect the remedy
of such complaining stockholders an inju.nction preventing
this misapplication of the funds of the corporation, is
very effectLal and is often granted by the coirts. Thus
where the directors of a coal couipany abandoned the business
for which the company was organizei and engaged in spec-
ulations in stock; etc., the court held that "The directors
of a moneyed or other joint stock corporation, who will-
fully abuse their trust or mis-ap)ly the funds of the com-
pany, by which a loss is sustained, a-'e personally liable
as trustees to make good the loss".(b)
----------------------------
(a) Atwool v Mierryweather; L.R. 5 _q. 454.
(b) Robinson v Smith; & ?aige 221.
When on thu other hand, the Altra vires acts have been
performed, or the parties cannot be placed in their origin-
al position tho courts are very rolucuant in setting aside
the transactions(a).
In attempting alfreeze out" the officers and cajority
stockholders frequently do all in their power to depress
the value of the stock, in order that, in the course of
time, the minority stockholders will be compelled to dis-
pose of their interest in the corporation, thus allowing
the majority or those acting in their interest, to get poss-
ession of the stock thus disposed of', and thereby effecting
the desired purpose.
According Lo principle the majority ought not to be
are
allowed to accoitplish such an object, and the courtsAtoler-
ably clear in upholding this doctrine, yet the-e are many
0
difficulties surrounding the granting of relief to those im-
posed upon. For instance, the directors and majority stock-
hoider-s may hold, with apparent good faith, that instead
of a declaration of the surplus assets being made, such
profits should be kept on hand by the corporation, for the
purpose of mneeting an c mergency, which they claim, aay con-
front the company. Because of no dividends being jistrib-
(a) Dodge v 1',oolsey; I8 Ho,;. (1 .S.1 36I.
uted among the stockhoILArs, the stock will necess6rily
fall in value, and if sich continies to be ti> casu, tiho
minority will be obliged to discose of LiLuir stock. Under
such circutitances ti ,  -,jori ,y accoi-l)ish their ubjec-,
and the courts are confronted with the barrier of apparent
good faith on the part of the majority, and as a resalt,
the minority often fail in accomplishing the impeachment
of the conduct of the controllins body. In the same manner
the ,,ajority often defeat the rights of the minority by
urging a retention of the surplus assets of the corporation,
to gobble up , at the first appropriate op_ ortunity, some
competing industry. If this latter plan is followed out
skillfully it is very difficult for the minority to obtain
relief.
A case illustrating the principle that it is contrary
to equitable principles for the majority to conduct the
affairs of the corporation with the view to depress the
value of the stock and compel the smaller stockholders to
sell it, is found in Barr v N.Y.L.E.'c W. R.Co. (96N.Y. 444.)
There the Erie Railway leased the Suspension Bridge and
Erie Junction Railway agreeing to pay 30% of the gross
earnings of the leased road, this sum not to be less than
#105,000 per annum. #70,000of this sum was to be paid as
-. p~ any .interest on the bonds of the 1eMr ind the remainder to
be distributed amonz, the stockholders of the lessor road
as dividends. The lessee road did not pay the portion
of rent which was to be distributed as dividends, and ob-
tained control of a majority of its stock. The Erie Rail-
way was sold to the defendant, the N.Y.L.E.&W. R.Co.,and
the officers of this latter road became officers of the
leased road. These officems conducted the affairs of the
leased road in such a manner as to render its stock almost
worthless, wi-h the intent to compel the minority to sell
their stock. The court granted the minority an accounting
and the payment of all rents in arrear.
SII (I) INSPECTION OF THE BOOPS OF THE CORPORATION.
In many of the states it is provided by statute that
the subscription books of the company shall be accessible
to all stockholders a certain period before a meeting at
which officers are to be elected or business of importance
is to , bee transacted.
Putting the books of the corporation beyond the reach
of the minority stockholders is commonly resorted to in
effecting some injury or wrong, and it therefore becomes
important to examine the result of such conauct on the
part of the majority.
In those states wher'e there are statutory requirements
allowing any stockholder to inspect the corporate books,
the-e is no controversy among the courts in enforcing the
statute upon the subject, and the matter is usually effected
by granting the injured members of the corporation a writ
of mandamus compelling the officers to allow the inspection
of the corporate books. There is a tendency, however, among
the courts to construe the statutes rather strictly. Thus
in New York, where it is provided by statute (a) that a
stockholder has the absolute right to inspect the books
within thirty days prior to the election of directors, it
--------------------------------
(a) La,,,s 1882 Chap. 409 sec. 199.
has been held that it is within the discretion of the court
to compel the company to allow an examination of the books
at other than the specified times.(a)
In New Jersey the statute provides that the chancellor
may, in his discretion, order the books of the corporation
to be brought into court and there inspected at any time.(b)
(2) VOTING.
It is generally conceded that the majority have no
right to exclude the votes of the minority, and the latter
may, by the aid of equity, have the question of good faith
on the part of the majority in their voting closely scruti-
nized.(c) This latter doctrine has also lately been laid
down by an English court.(d)
On the other hand, there seems to be no power in the
minority to prevent the majority stockholders from placing
their voting power in the hands of a single person, who
is to vote according to instructions. Such person, however,
must not be incapacitated to vote.(e) No complaint can be
made against the votes of one or mo'e of the stockholders
(a) "eo. v Eadie; 30 N.E. 1147.
(b) R~vision p. IS6 Sec. 50.
(c) Gamble v Queens Co. Water Co. 25 N.E. 201.
(d) Trans. Co.; L.R. App. Cases 589.
(e) State v Ohio-M.R.Co.; 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 415.
where the matter before the meeting is the confirmation
or recission of an agreement by which the stockholders in
question transfer their own property to the corporation. If
however, the persons so interested control a majority of
the stock and thence is fraud on their part in the sale od
such property, their right to vote will be questioned by
the courts.
(3) NOTICE OF MEETINIGS.
Where the by-laws or articles of incorporation of a
Provide
corporation for the giving of notice to the stockholders
a certain period of time before an election or special meet-
ing is to take place, the majority cannot pass a measure
in their behalf, and to the detriment of the minority stock-
holders' interest, without having notified all those who
would thus be injuredof the intended action, in order
that the latter may have opportunity, to be heard. The m-
jority can nev;r, under such circunstances, have their acts
sustained, even thoagh they be not detrimental to those
representing the minority and who were thus excluded from
the meetings.(a)
Where there is no re-alation in the charter or by-laws,
--------- -------- - ---------
(a) Wiggins v Freewill Baptist Church; 49 Mass. 301.
and the statute is silent upon the matter, each stockholder
must be notified of the intended meeting, or acts then
and there transacted, will not be valid and binding upon
the minority. Nor will any established usage of not giv-
ing notice validate the trans ction, when this matter has
been neglected. (a)
The majority by the violation of this general doctrine
often attempt to ignore the rights of the minority, and
if the former have among their number the officers and
directors of the corporation, it is very difficult for
the injured members of the corporation to obtain a proper
adjustment of their rights. In spite of this fact, the
courts have firmly established the principle that such act-
iori on the part of the majority is contrary to principles
of justice, and .ai vever it is possible to arrive at the
true state of affairs, the wrong will be remedied.
(4) DIVIDENDS.
The declaration of a dividend, as a rule, rests in the
fair and honest discretion of the directors of the corpo-
ration(b); but where the surplus earnings are needlessly
(a) Wiggins v Freewill Baptist Church; 49 Mass. 301.
(b) Robinson v Sith; 3 Paige39.
and improperly withheld, a court of equity will compel the
directors to distribute such surplus among the stockholders
(a).
While the courts often refase to compel the directors
to distribute the surplus assets, yet in nearly all the
instances in which this relief has been denied there has
been present the exercise of honest discretion on the part
of the officers. For example, it has been held that whe -e
the surplus on hand was not equal to mbre than one half
the debts of the corporation, a distribution would not be
compelled by the court.(b)
On the whole, the general tendency seems to be to
give the officers of the corporation considerable freedom
in this matter, and while the courts maintain the doctrin,
here laid down, yet it is requisite that there be a clear
case of fraud or very bad judgment before thywill grant
the complaining stockholders remedy.
In Beveridge v N.Y.El.R.R.Co.(II2 N.Y. I) the court
laid down the proposition that the directorqare to be
guided by their own discretion in the declaration of a
dividend and the matter will not be controlled by the courts.
(a) Smith v Prattville 3c Co.; 29 Ala. 503.
(b) Karnes v Rochester&GeneseeR.R.Co.; 4Abb.(11.S.) I07.
The judge in delivering the opinion in this case cited in
substantiation of the above aoctrino Williams v 7.1II.T.Co.;
93 N.Y. 162. - In 96 N.Y. it was
held that the declaration of a dividend rests in the fair
and honest discretion of the directors, which plainly does
not warrant the radical stand taken in the latter case.
It is plain that where the majority stockholders ratify
the refusal of the directors to declare a dividend, and
there has been actual fraud in the action of such directors,
the minority can, by resorting to equity, compel the direc-
tors to distribute the surplus funds of the corporation,
where it is clear that the circumstances warrant such a
decree. Where no fraud is present, but there is bad judg-
ment exercised by the directors in withholding a dividend,
it would seem that the ratification by the majority will
render the question final, and the minority must abide by
the decision thus reached.
(5) ISSUES OF WATERED STOCK.
Watered stock may be issued in various ways; but the
more usual methods resorted to are, (I) where an armount in
cash less than the par value of the stock is received and
it is issaed as fully paid up and) (2) where it is issued
for overvalued property turned over to the corporation.
The right of a corporation to issue stock as fully paid
up when in reality such is not the case-,has by most courts,
been deemed dangerous to honesty and general prosperity
and on this account not to be allowed. While some courts
admit that there are some benefits resulting from the issue
of watered stock, under certain circumstances, yet the dan-
gers of allowing such a privilege are so great that they
do not hesitate to deny this right to a corporation.
It matters not whether the majority stockholders rat-
ify the issue of stock for less than its par value, for a
single dissenting stockholder may, by bringing an action
in equity, restrain the issue. (a) If, however, a stock-
holder ratifies or in any way assists in the issue of
watered stock, it would seem that he waives all rights
relating to such issues.(b)
A dissenting stockholder can have shares fraudulently
issued below par, cancelled after they have been trans-
ferredto another party for value with notice of the trans-
action; for the rule under such circuinstances is, that the
transferee takes subject to the original equities and will
(a) Gamble v 0ueens Co. Water Co.; 25 N.E. 201.
(b) K"nowlton v Spring Co.; 57 N.Y. 518.
not be protacted. Where, however, a transferee does not
have such notice, he will not be affected by the fraad-
ulent issje. (a)
In some of the states therqare constitutional provis-
ions against issming stock below par. In New York, however,
the matter is now regulated by Sec. 4z of the Stock Corpo-
ration Law, wher3- it is d~cla ,)d that "No stock shal oe
issued for less than its par value". While this provision
in the New York statutes prevents the issue of stock for
less than its par value in roney, 7et vrator,3d stock is still
possibl.. Thus it is proviac J in the 3;.mn sjc-icn of t:c
ioe corporation lar that property mry be accepted in j ay-
ment of stock for the use and lawful purposes of the cor-
poration. This value is to be estimated by the officers
of the corporation, and even if there has been a marked
over-valuation,yet if there has been no fraud or bad faith
in the matter, the courts will not disturb the transaction.
Further, bonds of the corporation may be issued at their
fair market value and then exehanged for stock at par, mak-
ing an easy method of watering the stock. These are by
no means the only ways in which stock may be issued below
par in New York.
(a) Foreman v Bigelow; 4 Cliff. 508.
In most of the states it is provided by statute that
certain property may be accepted in payment of stock, un-
der varying circumstances. It has been noticed that New
York has a statute allowing such transactions.
It is generally held that in the absence of bad faith
on the part of the directors, in oveirestimating the value
of the property received in payment of stock, no one can
attack the transaction.(a) When, however, there is actual
fraud in the valuation of the property, a dissenting stdck-
holder may have Lhe stock cancelled and the property re-
turned, and should the stockholder bringing the action, so
desire the authorities seem to indicate that the persons
to whom the stock was issued may be compelled to pay the
difference between the par value of the st~ck and the amount
actually paid, the stock being thus made valid and bind-
ing upon all parties.(b) However, in Van Cott v Van Brunt;
82 N.Y. 535, the rule was laid down that the purchaser of
such shares will only be obliged to pay the difference be-
tween the market value of the stock and the actual amount
paid. This is certainly a wrong decision and contrary to
the weight of authority. As to whether this doctrine is
(a) Coit v N.C. Gold Amal. Co.; 7 Sup. Ct. Rep.(U.S.) 231.
(b) Elyton Land Co. v B.W.E1.Co.; 9 So. Rep. 129.
in accordance with the view of the present Ccurt of Apeals
is a doubtful matter, and until a direct decision is made,
the question will remain a moote-l one.
Where the promoter-s of a corporation just after its
incorporation and bofore others have subscribed to stock,
issue stock as fully paid up when such is not the case,
the subsequent subsc"ibers may compel the promoters to
pay up their subscriptions or the amount still due thereon.
(a) On the other hand, if the subsequent stockholders
treat the subseqiption as paid up, or do any other acts
that would lead to the conclusion that they have decided
to ratify the previous agreement between the promoters and
the corporation, which took place when the stock was taken,
then no action can be maintained by the subsequent stock-
holders. (b)
In the previous discus:sion of stock issued below par
the general attitude of the courts has been set forth, but
in the U.S. Supreme Court in a late decision, a different
view of watered stock has been taken. In Hanley v Statz;
139 U.S. 417, a corporation whose stock was selling below
par and being desirous of increasing its business by making
(a) Bailey v Gas Coal & Coke Co.; 69 Pa. St. 334.
(b) Id.
22
necessary improvjmjnts, issued stock at it3 par value, at
the same time adding as a bonus to the purchaser, bonds
of the corporation. The court held that "An active corpo-
ration, finding its original capital impaired by loss or
misfortune, may , for the purpos of recuperating itself,
and of producing new conditions for the successful prose-
cutiom of its business, issue new stock and put it upon
the market and sell it for the best price that can be ob-
tained".
The reasoning upon which the court proceeded was that
great injustice would result in a case like the one under
consideration if the capital stock could not thus be in-
creased, where the value of the stock had fallen below par.
In this case, however, it was expressly declared that the
doctrine thus established, ought not to be applied to cases
where the transaction was carried on merely for the purpose
of watering the stock, and not to improve the condition
of the corporation.
While there are many apparently good reasons for fav-
oring the doctrine laid down by the U.S. courts, when re-
stricted in the manne- there applied, yet if the right of
a corporation to issue watere-7 stock is recogonized at
all, it willibecome extremely difficult, if not impossible,
to keep the reins drawn tightly, and there will be a great
liability of thessue of watered stock under circumstances
which work great damage to business interests and general
honesty. It is better to entirely prohibit the issue of
stock below par, than to allow it under any circumstances.
The dir-ectors of a corporation have no right to give
away certificates of stock to contractors building the
road of the company in order that they may become majority
stockholders, and thus exert a controlling influence in the
election of officers and the management of the road.(a)
In such a case a dissenting stockholder may have the stock
thus disposed of, declared void. Further, in order that
ratification may estop such complaining stockholder, he
must have acted with a full knowledge of the facts.(b)
According to the weight of authority the corporation
has no right to give away stock under any circumstances,
for this is a power which is beyond the authority of a corpe-
ration.(c) Those taking certificates of stock enter into
an implied agreement that a debt is thereby created be-
tween the corporation and the stockholder for the par value
of the stock, and all stockholders become members of the
(a) R.R.Co. v Kelly; 77 Ill. 426.
(b) Id.
(a) Hanley v Stuts; 139 U.S. 417.
corporation upon this condition. This being the case,
the minority can obtain a complete remedy against the di-
rectors and majority stockholders, whenever an attempt is
made to evade the principle that stock cannot be given
away.
There is no sound reason for making a distinction be-
tween stock issued gratis and that issued as fully paid
up when only a portion of its par value has been paid.
In the former case there is certainly watered stock , and
to the greatest degree. Because of this, there should be
no difference in the view taken of the two cases by the
courts, and the rights of the minority should be identical
under both circumstances.
While most of the authoritiesake this view, yet in
New York, as indicated in the case of Christensen v Eno;
106 N.Y. 97# a distinction is made as to the liability of
the person receiving stock gratis and that which is issued
for an amount lessthan par. In the latter case he may be
compelled to pay at least the difference between the amount
actually paid for the stock and its market value, while
under the former circumstances he is under no liability
because of having received the stock as a present, for the
whole or a part of its value.
(6) CONSOLIDATION, AENDMENTS TO 'CHARTER, AND DISSOLUTION.
It is well established that in the absence of a pro-
vision in the charter or a general law existing at the
time of the creation of the corporation providing that ex-
tensions or alterations looking towards a consolidation
may be made, upon the fulfillment of certain conditions,
no majority however great can enter into an agreement to
alter or enlarge the business of the company, by consolida-
tion with other enterprises or in any manner whatever.
The reasoning being that each person when entering the
corporation, assumes the liabilities of a stockholder upon
the implied agreement that the business shall continue to
be that for which the corporation was created.
For the state to pass a measure in any manner affect-
ing the scope or nature of the business for which the cor-
poration was organized when no such right was given it
before the creation of the corporation, would clearly be
invalid, since it impairs the obligation of contracts be-
tween the stockholders and the state, as well as between
the corporation and the state. This doctrine wEs firmly
established in the Dartmouth College case, and has become
thosvughly settled throughout the country.
No matter if the majority are in favor of the consol-
idation or alteration of the nature of the business, the
minority cannot be compelled to enter a different business
than was carried on by the corporation when they entered it.
An exception to this general doctrine is recogonized where
public policy or necessity demands a consolidation. In such
a case, however, the Legislature must provide that the
dissenting stockholders shall be paid a fair and just
amount for their stock in the old corporation.
In a Ne; Jersey case it was held that where the Legis-
lature empowered a railroad corporation of that state to
purchase a certain other railroad, with the condition that
"None of the rights &c of the stockholders of the purchased
road shall be injuriously affected", if a single stockhold-
er of the purchased road object to the transaction, it will
be set aside.(a) The court proceeded on the theory that
this sale was a bargain which all mlist assent to, on account
of the condition upon which the stockholders became mem-
bers of the corporation.
This doctrine is carried so far, that it has been held
where the articles of association of an express company
providedthat an amendment to them might be made by a con-
current vote of two thirds of the executive committee and
a majority of the trustees, a consolidation could not be
effected in this manner against the consent 
of a dissent-
ing stockholder. (a)
7nhere the Legislature has provided that subsequent
charters of corporations may be altered or amended so that
at
consolidations may be affectedithe will of' the majority
or a certain proportion of the stockholders, it is gener-
ally held that a dissenting stockholder cannot impeach the
transaction, in the absence of fraud, his only remedy being,
if he absolutely refuse to enter the new corporation or
the altered one, to have the value of his siock appraised,
and the amount as thus estimated, paid him.
Where the changes proposed are inmmaterial, the minority
will not be recogonized by the courts when attempting to
have the modification declared invalid.
In Utah the statute provides that any corporation may
consolidate with any other upon two thirds vote of all the
stock at a special meeting. In Ill. corporations engaged in
the same general business and carrying on business in the
same locality, may consolidate under like circumistances.
In Maine a majority may sanction a consolidation, but the
minority by going into court may have their stock appraised
and the amount paid to them. By Pa. Corporation Law sec. 38
it is made lawful for any corporation to sell and dispose
(a) Blatchford v Ross; 54 Bar. 42.
oZ all its corpooate property. It is provided in Maryland
that consolidation of two corporations may take place if a
majority of the stockholders of each corpo-ation so agree.
The statutes of Tenn. declare that street railway, gas
and electric plant, and water companies, are forbidden to
consolidate with any similar corporation within the same
city or town, without the consent of the municipal govern-
ment. By a three fourths vote of the stock, all and any
corporations may consolidate in the state of Nevada. In
California it appears possible for general corporations
to consolidate(a).
By Laws 1892, Chap. 691, it is provided in New York
that when two thirds of the stockholders, shall agree, a
consolidation of business corporations may take place, but
the stock of the dissenting stockholders must be paid for.
Railroads in New York having intersecting lines, may con-
solidate with the consent of two thirds of the stockholders.
When two lines run par. lel to each other, however, consol-
idations are forbidden.( Laws 1890, Chap. 565.)
By one railroad leasing another line for a long period
of years, a virtual consolidation of the two line3 is effected,
but this is not allowed, the courts holding that in the
(a) Stimson American Statute Law Vol. II Sections 8380,8381.
absence of a provision in the articles of incorporation,
no such right will be allowed Lnless all the stockholders
consent to the agreement, or there is a generalto that
effect upon the statute books which was in existence at
the time of the creation of the corporation.(a) It has
been held, however, that where the charter of a railroad
company contains the provision that it may be leased upon
the assent of three fourths of the stockholders of the cor-
poration, such lease will be binding upon this condition
being complied with, even though the result of the trans-
action be that the preferred stockholders, only receive
profits. b)
As to amendments to the charter of a corporatiorn in
general, it may be said that in order that they may be
valid against the opposition of a sinle dissenting stock-
holder, there must either be a reservation of such power
by the Legislature in the charter of the corporation, or
there must have existed at the creation of the corporation
a general law giving this power to the Legislature, to
which all corporations are subject. If this were not the
case, the U.S. constitutional provision that "No state
(a) Abbott v Johnson kc Horse R.Co., 80 N.Y. 27.
(b) Town of ;liddletown v Bos. _ N.Y. Air Line R.Co., 52
Conn. 35I.
shall passany law impairing the obli ation of contracts"
would be clearly disregarded. The stockholders became mem-
bers of the corporaLion under an implied agreement that
the nature and score of the corporate business should re-
main the same, unless all deem it advisable to effect this
change under the authority of an amendmant to ti e corpo-
ration's charter.
If the amendment be slight or immaterial, it will not
be set aside, being deemed to injure no one seriously.
In Maine and New Jersey it is held that although there
be a general law providing that the charter of a corpora-
tion shall be subject to alteration, suspension and repeal
in the discretion of the Legislature, and also a provision
in the charter of the corporation to the same effect, yet
the amendment will be of no effect unless all the stock-
holders accept it .(a) The reasoning applied in the New
Jersey case is, that it was plainly the intention of the
Legislature not to give power to one part of the corpora-
tion as against the other, which was not before allowed.
A thorough and careful study of the ease in question,
shows that the court deemed the rule there laid down only
applicable in extreme cases.
(a) Oldtown & Lincoln R. Co. v Veasie; 39 iie. 571.
Zabriskie v R.R. Co.; 18 N.J. Eq. I/s.
A contrary view is taken in a wL-jority of the states.
In New York and Mass. it is held that the Legislature
has the power to alter or extend the enterprises of the
corporation without the consent of the stockholders.(a)
The courts of Missouri and Illinois take the stand that the
majority stockholders with the legislative enactment, may
make a change providing it be not a radical one.(b)
The majority stockholdel's cannot effect a dissolution
of the corporation against the will of the minority when
it id in a fairly prosperous condition. In New York it
has even been held that in the event of insolvency of a
manufacturing corporation, it remains in the discretion of
the court to sanction a dissolution.(c) In Kean v Johnson;
9 N.J. Eq. 401, the court in discussing this matter made
use of the following lucid and expressive language: "A
majority of stockholders in a prosperous corporation, can-
not at their own mere caprice, sell out the whole source
of their emoluments and invest their capital in other
enterprises, where the minority desire the prosecution of
the business in which they had engaged. The contract is,
(a) Buffalo & N.Y. City R.Co.v, Dudley, 14 N.Y. 336.
(b) R.R.Co. v Hughes, 22 Mo. 291.
(a) Denike v Lime Co., 80 N.Y. 599.
that their joint funds shall, under the care of the spec-
ified persons, generally called directors, be employed,
and that for specified purposes".
It is plain that the directors of th6 corporation alone,
cannot dissolve it, for what the majority stockholders can-
not do, is certainly beyond the power of these officers.(a)
In some of the cases thereis an inclination towards the
view that the majority in interest of the stockholders may
dissolve the corporation by a voluntary surrender of its
franchises, even though a minority oi' the stockholders are
opposed to the dissolution. A careful reading of these
cases, however, will disclose the fact that most of them
arose under circa;nstances in which it would have been ruin-
ous to continue the corporate business, or at any rate, to
the interest of all the stockholders to have the corporation
dissol ved. It is generally conceded by most of the au-
thorities that where it will be disasterous to continue
the business of the corporation, the majority may dissolve
it even though the minority strenuously oppose such action,
and hence the cases just referred to, can hardly be said
to be exceptions to the general rule.
(a) Jones v Bank of Leadville, 17 Pac. 272.
III. \MANNER IN WHlICH THE MINORITY MAY BRING ACTIONS.
Where there has been fraud in the mana,-ement of a cor-
poration, the party p'imarily inju -ed is the corporation,
the stockholders being considerci distinct from the corpo-
ration, and only indirectly affected. This principle, has
become firmly fixed in the decisions of the courts, and
it is clearly settled that when a corporation has been in-
jured in any manner whatever, the proper party to sue, is
the corporation itself. When, however, the circumstances
are such, that relief can only be obtained by the institu-
tion of a suit by a stockholder, he will be granted a hear-
ing by the courts.
In discussing this subject, Pomeroy says: "Although
the corporation holds all the title, legal or equitable
to the corporate property, and is the immediate cestui
que trust under the directors with respect to such property
and is theoretically, the only proper party to sue for
wrongful dealings with that property, yet courts of equity
recogfnize the truth that the stockholders are ultimately
the only beneficiaries, that their rights are realy though
indirectly protected by remedies given to the corporation,
and that the final object of suits by the corporation is
to maintain the interests of the stockholders.-------
Hencewhenever a cause of action exists )rimariiy in behalf
of the corporation against directors, officers and others,
for wrongful dealings with corporate property, or wrongful
exercise of corporate franchises,--.------ and the corpora-
tion either actually or virtually refuses to institute or
prosecute such a suit, then, in order to prevent a failure
of justice, an action may be brought and maintained by a
stockholder or stockholders". (a)
Where the facts in the complaint show that the defen-
dants charged with the wron : doing, o- soiae of them, con-
stitute a majority of the directors or managing body at
the time of commencing the suit, so that a refusal to
bring suit by them can reasonably be inferred, the minority
stockholders in bringing the action need not aver that an
attempt has been made to have the managing bodyinstitute
the suit.(b) In the case of Atwool v Merryweather, L.R.5
Eq. 464, a suit by a stockholder was sustained, although
no demand or request to sue had been made to the atanaging
body, and no leave to sue had been obtained, because the
principal defendant, a director, by means of the very
fraud complained of, had control of a majority of the votes
(a) Pomeroy Equity Jurisprudence, Vol. 111,0p 9,10.
(b) Brewer v Bos. Theater Co., 104 Mass. 318-
in the managing body.
In those cases where those complained against have not
complete control over the affairs of the corporation, so
that it is possible that the corporation itself inight,
upon being appealed to, bring the action, the com laint
must allege that the officers of the corporation have been
app3aled to, but withut success. In general, the court
must be satisfied that the complaining party or parties
could not find redress through the officers of the corpo-
ration, or by any action among the stockholders.(a)
It is invariably held that in actions by the minority
stockholders the corporation inust be a party to the suit,
usually being made defendant. The prope- course is to
join as plaintiffs the minority stockholders, or to bring
the suit in the name of one of the dissenting stockholders,
in behalf of himself and all of the other stockholders who
may choose to come in; and all others acting in behalf of
the corporation whom it is alleged have taken part in
committing the wrongs, the majority stockholders, and the
corporation itself, are to be made defendants.
It is to be noticed that the corporation is the party
primarily to be benefited by the result of the suit brought
by the minority, and the latter are benefited only indi-
(a) Bre";ar v Theator Co. 104 Mas. 678.
rectly, it being the corporation alone that was directly
affected by the wrrongful acts.
In all cases the stockholders must not have been guilty
of laches in urging the remaining stockholder's to take
action or allowing such a period of time to elapse that
the courts may reasonably suppose that th, dissenting stock-
holders have acquiesced in the acts complained of, for un-
der such circumstances relief will always be denied by the
courts.
IV. CONCLUSION.
on
Perhaps the greatest objection to carryingbusiness
enterprises by means of the corporation, is the fact that
the majority rule is so liable to work injury upon the
small stockholders who go to make up the minority. This
condition of affairs is constantly being deplo'ed, and
sometimes the magnitude of the frauds committed upon the
minority so completely overshadow all the good elements
of the corporation, that this mode of transacting business
is bitterly condemned, both by the courts and the Legis-
lature; and it is forgotten how much the corporation has
done to encourage capitalists to engage in what previously
were considered hazardous enterprises in the highest degree.
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While it is unfortunate that the majority are able to
work so much injury upon the minority, oftentimes with no
probability of the latter obtaining relief, yet this state
of affairs is unavoidabil. ,i)eing a necessary adherent of
corporations,as they are now regarded. It is inconsistent
with the very existence of a corporation that the rule
should be reversed and the minority control the affairs of
the corporation,for this would lead to far greater wrongs
than exist at the present time.
The position Which the minority should occupy in a
corporation, is that of a regulating body, which is will-
ing to heartily aid the majority when in the honest opinion
of the latter such action is for the true welfare of the
corporation, but at those times when it is evident that
the majority are acting for their own interest and not
for the benefit of the corporation, after striving to the
utmost to effect a remedy within the corporation, this in-
jured body should resort to the courts for relief.
When the minority have conducted themselves in this
manner it is seldom that the courts turn them away without
remedy.
It is encouraging to note the attitude which courts of
equity, especially, are taking towards new grievances in-
flicted by the majority upon the minority, and it is safe
to say that in a comparatively short period of time, equity
will be able and willing to grant the minority a remedy
for all real injuries which ttey have suffered at the hands
of the majority. Perhaps the legislatures will be able
to aid the courts somewhat in bringing about this desired
state of affairs, yet for the most part, the matter may
be left with the courts, who are sure to learn wherein
they have failed in the past, and profit by the discovery.
